Friday, March 13, 2015

For the Record: Do higher education rankings mean anything?



THE TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION WORLD REPUTATION RANKINGS 2015: FULL TABLES
Copyright Times Higher Education 2015.
If this table or extracts from it are reproduced in any way, you must link to www.thewur.com 
2015 reputation rank2014 reputation rankInstitutionCountry / region
11Harvard UniversityUnited States
24University of CambridgeUnited Kingdom
35University of OxfordUnited Kingdom
42Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyUnited States
53Stanford UniversityUnited States
66University of California, BerkeleyUnited States
77Princeton UniversityUnited States
88Yale UniversityUnited States
99California Institute of TechnologyUnited States
1012Columbia UniversityUnited States
1114University of ChicagoUnited States
1211University of TokyoJapan
1310University of California, Los AngelesUnited States
1413Imperial College LondonUnited Kingdom
1516ETH Zürich – Swiss Federal Institute of Technology ZurichSwitzerland
1620University of TorontoCanada
1725University College LondonUnited Kingdom
1818Johns Hopkins UniversityUnited States
1915University of MichiganUnited States
2017Cornell UniversityUnited States
2027New York UniversityUnited States
2224London School of Economics and Political ScienceUnited Kingdom
2322University of PennsylvaniaUnited States
2421National University of SingaporeSingapore
2551-60Lomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation
2636Tsinghua UniversityChina
2719Kyoto UniversityJapan
2829Carnegie Mellon UniversityUnited States
2946University of EdinburghUnited Kingdom
3023University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUnited States
3143King’s College LondonUnited Kingdom
3241Peking UniversityChina
3331University of WashingtonUnited States
3430Duke UniversityUnited States
3546Ludwig Maximilian University of MunichGermany
3533McGill UniversityCanada
3733University of British ColumbiaCanada
3832University of California, San FranciscoUnited States
3861-70Heidelberg UniversityGermany
3828University of Wisconsin-MadisonUnited States
4140University of California, San DiegoUnited States
4171-80Humboldt University of BerlinGermany
4143University of MelbourneAustralia
4451-60University of California, DavisUnited States
4551-60Karolinska InstituteSweden
4633University of Texas at AustinUnited States
4737Northwestern UniversityUnited States
4849École Polytechnique Fédérale de LausanneSwitzerland
4938Georgia Institute of TechnologyUnited States
5051-60University of ManchesterUnited Kingdom
51-6071-80University of AmsterdamNetherlands
61-70Australian National UniversityAustralia
42Delft University of TechnologyNetherlands
81-90Free University of BerlinGermany
43University of Hong KongHong Kong
71-80Katholieke Universiteit LeuvenBelgium
Panthéon-Sorbonne University – Paris 1France
71-80Paris-Sorbonne University – Paris 4France
81-90University of São PauloBrazil
26Seoul National UniversityRepublic of Korea
61-70University of SydneyAustralia
61-7061-70University of California, Santa BarbaraUnited States
École Normale SupérieureFrance
81-90Leiden UniversityNetherlands
51-60National Taiwan UniversityTaiwan
University of North Carolina*United States
39Pennsylvania State UniversityUnited States
61-70University of Southern CaliforniaUnited States
61-70Technical University of MunichGermany
-Wageningen University and Research CenterNetherlands
71-8071-80Boston UniversityUnited States
81-90Brown UniversityUnited States
51-60Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHong Kong
61-70Michigan State UniversityUnited States
51-60University of MinnesotaUnited States
National Autonomous University of MexicoMexico
71-80University of PittsburghUnited States
48Purdue UniversityUnited States
91-100Rutgers, the State University of New JerseyUnited States
Saint Petersburg State UniversityRussian Federation
81-90Utrecht UniversityNetherlands
81-90University of CopenhagenDenmark
Durham UniversityUnited Kingdom
University of HelsinkiFinland
51-60Ohio State UniversityUnited States
81-90University of QueenslandAustralia
71-80Texas A&M UniversityUnited States
University of WarwickUnited Kingdom
71-80Washington University in St LouisUnited States
Uppsala UniversitySweden
91-100University of BristolUnited Kingdom
École PolytechniqueFrance
91-100London Business SchoolUnited Kingdom
81-90University of Maryland, College ParkUnited States
61-70University of MassachusettsUnited States
81-90Mayo Medical SchoolUnited States
Monash UniversityAustralia
91-100Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore
Pasteur InstituteFrance
91-100RWTH Aachen UniversityGermany

Thursday, March 12, 2015

For the Record: Dr. Judy Stone - What A Scathing External Report On Protections In Research Missed -- Or Ignored


Link to original piece by Dr. Judy Stone


In Part 1 about the review of clinical research protections at the UMN, I focused on the critical findings of the AAHRPP reviewers. Today I explain on what is missing from their report.

What the AAHRPP missed

The five most critical unreported items, although the AAHRPP was informed of them, follow. First, nurses on the psych unit did not even know if a patient was participating in a clinical trial. Thus, they wouldn’t know if a change in the patient might be due to an adverse reaction to a med. For example, Fox 9’s Jeff Baillon reported on a patient, “Robert,” who participated in a Bifupronex trial he felt coerced into participating on. Yet Niki Gjere, a clinical nurse specialist on that unit, said she was unaware of any clinical trials being conducted then. This incident spurred her to speak out about breaches in standard clinical trial conduct.

Shockingly, experimental medicines were not documented on the MAR (med administration record) or inpatient chart. One staff nurse suspects that either the physicians administered the investigational meds when they rounded or the patients received the investigational meds when they were taken to an adjacent ambulatory center. This is unheard of in any trial I did, where drug accountability for investigational meds was akin to tracking narcotics. I’ve never worked in a unit where medicines weren’t charted. Again, it also makes monitoring for adverse events, critical to any study, impossible.

Possible HIPAA violations reportedly occurred—intake people at Fairview Hospital gave the psychiatry department information about admitting diagnoses without the patients’ consent, allowing coordinators to then approach the patient about clinical trials. This is a serious breach of patient confidentiality. Is this still occurring?


While some recusals from IRB review did occur (p. 25), leaving the IRB without a subject matter expert, certainly there were egregious conflicts of interest on the IRB. For example, Dr. David Adson was Chair of the IRB panel that reviewed Markingson’s death on the CAFÉ trial. Adson was a colleague to Dr. Olson, the Principal Investigator on that trial, and reported to Charles Schulz, Chair of his department and coinvestigator on the CAFÉ trial. It gets better. Adson chaired the IRB that approved the CAFÉ study, and then chaired the panel that “examined” the report of Markingson’s death…nothing to see here; move along…Adson had large financial conflicts of interest as well with AstraZeneca, sponsor of the CAFÉ trial, detailed in this Hastings Center report.


Finally, the consultant AAHRP reviewers were told by faculty about seemingly fraudulent appearing forms assessing the patient’s capability to consent. While they may claim that this was not part of the charge they received from President Kaler, did they not have a moral and ethical obligation to include an apparent illegal activity in their report? Or does their silence on this, and other questions, reflect on their cozy relationship with the UMN? After all, the UMN pays AHHRPP for accreditation, and these shocking ethical breaches were never picked up by AAHRPP.

Note: The AAHRPP was asked to respond to these concerns and have declined to do so.*

The University’s response

One of the most troublesome things is the response of the UMN leadership to these findings. President Kaler cheered the AAHRPP report, exclaiming, “I am particularly gratified—but not surprised—that the panel found no legal or compliance violations, affirming numerous previous reviews and accreditations of our program.” He seems oblivious to how the UMN was skewered in a report that was, in some circles, anticipated to be another whitewash. The AAHRPP slammed the IRB for failure to engage “in a meaningful process of evaluating research risk” (p. 78), for lacking “scientific expertise necessary to review studies (p. 26) and for lacking adequate protections for vulnerable patients. They scathingly note, ““Most striking was the commonly conveyed sense of doubt in leadership’s commitment to human subjects protection,” yet Kaler is proud of the UMN’s program.

Kaler’s claim is a bit misleading. It is unclear that the UMN was actually “cleared” of illegal activity—specifically, the report notes: “University policy and IRB protocols reflect inconsistencies and, in some cases, appear to be at odds with Minnesota law…the prohibition against research consent by a legal guardian without a  specific court order does not appear to be applied consistently.”

While Brian Herman, Vice President for Research just announced to me and the Faculty Senate, “We will be transparent about our actions – sharing information about our progress, neither his office, that of President Kaler, IRB chairs, nor the AAHRPP reviewers would return my calls nor answer any of my written questions. They have yet to respond to many of the other important issues raised by Dr. Elliott either.

The other dubious claim from Herman was “Now, we will be accountable for taking action.” Does that mean that the VP for Research didn’t believe he was accountable for ensuring the safety of research subjects before? That’s a pretty appalling admission.

Kaler and Herman were asked for comment and declined to respond to my questions.

Looking forward

President Kaler has reiterated that the UMN must be forward looking.

To do so, I would suggest the following initial steps:

Appoint external people to the panel to implement the AAHRPP report recommendations. The people named thus far do not have credibility, since many of the problems occurred on their watch. I might suggest asking Trudo Lemmens (U. Toronto), Susan Reverby (Wellesley professor who uncovered the unethical Guatemalan syphilis experiments) for suggestions from his co-authors and almost 200 academics who called for an investigation of the UMN.

Transparency would be important and go further than talking points. That no one answered my, or others’ questions, gives the impression that nothing will change at the UMN.

Stifling of dissent by monitoring faculty and intimidating staff has to be addressed.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission might be helpful. It is certainly warranted. In the meantime, in my opinion, the UMN must formally extend apologies to Mary Weiss, Mike Howard, “Robert” and all the others harmed in their studies. Notably, this should include Carl Elliott, who has been particularly harassed when he should, instead, be applauded for his courage, decency, and ethics.


*Correction: Anne Donahue was not contacted prior to publication. Melissa Frumkin responded to my questions, I thought for the panel of AAHRPP reviewers, with “our presence at the March 6 public forum with the UMN faculty senate concluded our involvement with this matter. We believe our report speaks for itself and have decided that we will not be available for further comment.” Donahue has since been asked to comment. If she does, the post will be updated to reflect that.


Wednesday, March 11, 2015

For the Record: done nothing wrong... Dr. Mickey Nardo - 1 Boring Old Man - on #Markingson


Dr. Mickey Nardo writes a blog, 1Boring Old Man.  

"Mickey Nardo MD represents all the psychiatrists in the trenches who have had more than enough of incompetent APA leadership. He writes what is by far the best available psychiatric blog under the misleadingly modest nom-de-blog ‘1boringoldman.’ Dr. Nardo is definitely not boring and by my standards is not that old. Anyone who regularly reads his blog will agree that he lives up only to the last part of the title — he is indeed a mensch."



done nothing wrong…

Posted on Tuesday 10 March 2015


In the case of Dan Markingson at the University of Minnesots, you might recall that in spite of the university senate voting to have that case investigated, the President ordered only an investigation of the research program "looking forward", not the case itself [too deep to ignore…]. I guess we thought that the University President had done a bit of sleight of hand yet again [almost inevitable…]. But, sometimes things are bad enough to over-ride any attempts at diversion. The report came in last week, and it was a scathing indictment:

SCIENCEINSIDER
by Jennifer Couzin-Frankel
March 2015

A damning report on how the University of Minnesota [UM] protects volunteers in its clinical trials concludes that researchers inadequately reviewed research studies across the university and need more training to better protect the most vulnerable subjects. It also found that a “climate of fear” existed in the Department of Psychiatry, where concerns about clinical trials first surfaced.

The 97-page report, released 27 February, was prepared by a group of six experts appointed by the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs. It comes after years of complaints by some UM faculty members, led by bioethicist Carl Elliott. They charged that the school and its doctors failed to protect 27-year-old Dan Markingson, who died by suicide while enrolled in a psychiatric drug trial in 2004. They also expressed grave concerns about how Markingson’s death was investigated. [More on that case is here and here.[

Recently, Elliott’s crusade began having an impact. In December 2013, the UM Faculty Senate called for an independent review of current practices in clinical trials. The administration agreed to open its records to outsiders. Although the review did not look back at history, it nonetheless had plenty to say about how the university handles trials, which bring in millions of dollars from drug companies along with much prestige.

“[T]he external review team believes the University has not taken an appropriately aggressive and informed approach to protecting subjects and regaining lost trust,” the authors write. They examined protocols from 20 active trials as well as minutes from meetings of the institutional review board [IRB]. Many IRB members, the panel noted, did not regularly attend meetings from January to July 2014. “[T]here were no individuals on the IRB during this time period with expertise in adult hematology, oncology and transplant, cardiology, surgery, or neurology, although those fields taken together represented over 300 protocols. There was only one psychiatrist on the IRB, despite the fact that the Psychiatry Department submitted 85 protocols for review during the time period examined.” That doctor attended only four of the 26 medical IRB meetings at which new protocols were reviewed. “This departure not only contravenes the University’s own policy of having at least one member with ‘primary professional expertise in a scientific field relevant to the type of research reviewed by that panel,’ but also prompts concern about the quality of review.”

Fueling those concerns, the authors noted that the IRB spent an average of 3 to 5 minutes discussing each protocol, and there was “little discussion of the risks and benefits to subjects.” Most of the protocol changes the IRB asked researchers to make addressed administrative issues such as misspellings or adding standard language to a consent form. Requests by researchers running trials to modify who was eligible for a study—“changes that may increase or decrease risks to subjects—were almost always approved without any documentation of related discussion,” the authors write. “The review process, as documented in the minutes, does not reflect a meaningful discussion of the risks and benefits of research protocols and the necessary steps taken to protect human subjects in the face of scientific or ethical concerns”…

Surely ethics refers to more than a code of conduct, or the rules of right and wrong, or even the letter of the law. It comes from the word ethos, the culture of a place, and should offer a compass for navigating situations where there are no standing rules or precedents – something more felt than transcribed, something conveyed by example rather than memoranda or training manual. And when I’ve read about this case, their response has always been, "We did nothing wrong," but my mind always inserts, "And you didn’t do anything right either." I thought the external reviewers were most at the center when they said this about the ethosthey encountered in their investigation:

In interviews, some University personnel described considerable “fatigue” related to what they considered unrelenting and unjustified criticism of the University’s human subjects protection program. In contrast, others expressed bewilderment and frustration that, in their view, the University has failed to understand and remedy problems stemming from and related to “Markingson.” Most striking was the commonly conveyed sense of doubt in leadership’s commitment to human subjects protection. The widespread characterization of a few researchers in the Department of Psychiatry as “untrustworthy” and as creating a “culture of fear” in relation to efforts to enhance the protection of research subjects was of major concern to the external review team.
Dan’s hospitalization was from 2003 to 2004. Around the same time, Allen Jones happened onto TMAP and blew a whistle. Jon Juriedini in Australia first wrote the JAACAP about Paxil Study 329 in 2003. Charlie Nemeroff got busted for the first instance of his unacknowledged COI around that time. These instances turned out to be the tip of an iceberg. It was as if the traditional medical ethics had been invaded by the ethos of commerce, that patients had become subjects to be recruited for clinical trials designed to sell drugs, and marketing had become the strong undertow that was pulling everything out to sea.


While Bioethicist Carl Elliot has lead the struggle to get action on the Markingson case, he hasn’t been alone. His colleague, Leigh Turner, has also been involved, and spoke up in the faculty meeting Friday where this report was released [seeResearch methods under fire]:

We’re acting as though this report is news, but in fact there’s been several years where concerns have been brought forward in very detailed, concrete ways,” he said at the meeting. Turner said University leadership hasn’t adequately responded to problems he says have been happening within the program for years, and he questioned University President Eric Kaler’s commitment to repair the program’s current state.
Even that sounds like an understatement. University President Eric Kaler, Psychiatry Chairman Charles Schulz, and researcher Stephen Olson have obstructed previous efforts for over a decade, sticking with the "done nothing wrong" refrain.


"We did nothing wrong" is a legal standard – the standard by which we define criminal behavior in a free society based on the rule of law. An ethical standard is different. For one thing, in medicine, it is impossible to do "nothing wrong." But beyond that, an ethical standard has to do with maintaining an ethos, a culture. In a Clinical Trial of a new medication, it’s incumbent on the trialist to be vigilant that the subject’s health and medical care is not compromised by participation.

In the case of Dan Markingson and the University of Minnesota, that ethos was betrayed down the line by …
  • the design and purpose of the C.A.F.E. study
  • the oversight function of the Institutional Review Board
  • the recruitment and inclusion of Dan Markingson
  • his ongoing psychiatric care
  • the subsequent responses of Institution
While we can never know how Dan might have fared had he been treated outside the Clinical Trial environment, we can easily see that the ethical imperatives that even allow these Clinical Trials were globally deficient in the case. And it’s equally apparent that the officials of the Institution in charge show little understanding of their ethical obligations, even when repeatedly reminded by the faculty of their own Department of Bioethics.

Carl Elliot, Leigh Turner, Mike Howard, and Dan’s mother, Mary Weis, have done something remarkable. They’ve moved rhetorical deliberations about medical ethics out if the ivory towers of academia; breathed a new life into them with this paradigmatic real world case; and taken their campaign to the streets. Likewise, the external reviewers appointed by the the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs who were given only a restricted scope of inquiry [too deep to ignore…almost inevitable…a paradigm…] were still able to identify fundamental deficiencies in the Clinical Trial Program at the University of Minnesota, even after a decade of opportunity to make needed changes since Markingson’s death. Elliot’s team and these reviewers have obviously "done something right."

But there’s much that remains. This is a local victory, but it addresses problems we all know have a much broader scope. So will this instance lead to a general investigation of the Institutional Review Board system to insure it providesfunctional oversight rather than simply signing off? Is there a mechanism to shut down Clinical Research programs that don’t create an appropriate ethos with theethical imperatives that protect the subjects under study? And there’s one topic that isn’t even touched here: Should we even allow Clinical Trials that are undertaken for commercial purposes [like C.A.F.E.] that have no real medical/scientific value [experimercials]? While we can stand in awe of the energy it has taken for Carl Elliot’s group to get this far, there are going to have to be a lot more people devoted to "doing something right" to generalize their campaign…


Tuesday, March 10, 2015

For the Record: Dr. Judy Stone - UMN's Clinical Research Practices -- Far From "Beyond Reproach"



See no, hear no, speak no evil

 – Inge Vandormael on Deviant Art


Dr. Judy Stone, not just another wacko,
 writes:

 Leaders at the University of Minnesota seem to living in a parallel universe to many of us, fervent in their delusion that all is well at the state’s flagship institution of higher learning. It is they who are not learning. Last week, the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs (AAHRPP) came out with a sharply critical report on the state of research practices at the U. Many of us were surprised, having suspected that the report would be another whitewash, as it was bought and paid for by the UMN, and also because of conflicts of interest, with AAHRPP also accrediting⁠ the UMN program.


Given President Kaler’s repeated goal (and seeming belief) of a research program that is “beyond reproach,” it is particularly damning that the AAHRPP concluded, “the University’s efforts with regard to human subjects protections do not consistently reflect “best practices” and are not, at this point, even remotely “beyond reproach.”


The report came out of a long-standing controversy over the death of Dan Markingson, a psychotic young man who committed suicide while participating in an Astra-Zeneca trial. Dan had been offered a “choice” of involuntarily commitment or obeying the recommendations of his psychiatrist, Dr. Stephen Olson, Director of the UMN’s schizophrenia research. This prompted considerable questions about research practices at the UMN, particularly on studies involving vulnerable populations. Dr. Carl Elliott, a bioethicist at UMN has written extensively about this⁠, as have I, including: Lack of an informed consent, investigator’s shirking their responsibilitiesand serious conflicts of interest among the investigators and Institutional Review Board (IRB) charged with overseeing the trial.


AAHRPP critical findings

A few of the damning findings include (page numbers refer to this pdf⁠):


—“inadequate and inconsistent attention to the process of consent, capacity to consent, the use of surrogate decision-makers, and general efforts to address vulnerability of potential research subjects to coercion and undue influence” p 9


—“Most striking was the commonly conveyed sense of doubt in leadership’s commitment to human subjects protection. The widespread characterization of a few researchers in the Department of Psychiatry as ‘untrustworthy’ and as creating a ‘culture of fear’ in relation to efforts to enhance the protection of research subjects was of major concern to the external review team.” p 10


—In regards to the University’s Research Strategic Plan, “there is a notable absence of specific objectives relevant to human subject protections or research ethics more broadly.” p 23


Education and Training


—“Beyond the basic CITI requirements, though, there are currently no human subjects protections training requirements for investigators, including those working with high-risk or vulnerable populations.” p 42


—“One recent change in practice implemented pursuant to this initiative is the reported elimination of the ‘Responsible Conduct of Research’ (RCR) continuing education course requirement for faculty, resulting in 3,900 hours in total annual time savings.”8 “It was hard for the external review team to understand why researcher education in ethics and responsible conduct of research would be considered an ‘administrative burden,’ especially at a time when the University’s leadership should be signaling its intention to strengthen its protections for research subjects.” p 24


Dr. Charles Schulz is the chair of the Department of Psychiatry. Yet in his testimony in the wrongful death suit brought by Dan Markingson’s mother, Mary Weiss (p. 156),Schulz said that he hadn’t even read the consent form for a study in which he was a co-investigator (and was listed on the FDA Form 1572 as being a responsible party). Further, Schulz, a leading schizophrenia researcher, was not aware that informed consent requires disclosure of financial COIs⁠, arguing that disclosing information about his financial ties to the study sponsor could “confuse” the situation.


Scientific Review of Proposals

—Noted an “apparent lack of rigor and consistency in departmental-level scientific review” p 50


—“there was only a single documented scientific reviewer for five studies, in clear violation of the University’s policy.” p 48


—“cases were identified where the scientific review was completed by a subordinate faculty member for research in which a department chair was the principal investigator. In these cases, a conflict of interest exists” p 51


IRB:


—“evidence of weak and often inadequately expert review of research” (by the IRB) p 9


—“The failure to have either adequate number of IRB members, or adequate expertise, during IRB deliberations raises profound questions about the IRB’s ability to conduct a robust and reliable protocol review.” p 27


—“The Medical IRB does not routinely have the requisite number of members or expertise at its meetings to properly handle the number of studies it reviews.” p 31


—“the team found little discussion of the risks and benefits to subjects.” p 33


—“the length of time allotted for IRB review was alarmingly inadequate given the number of complex items scheduled for review.” (Ave time for review was 3-5 minutes) p 34


—“The review process, as documented in the minutes, does not reflect a meaningful discussion of the risks and benefits of research protocols and the necessary steps taken to protect human subjects in the face of scientific or ethical concerns.” p 35


—“the IRB review process may be unacceptable, and that it often contravenes the IRB’s own policies and procedures.” p 35


— Several Department of Psychiatry protocols “did not appear to give serious consideration to evaluating the risks involved” p 67


—“University policy, which assumes capacity to consent to research absent ‘substantial evidence’ to the contrary, is inconsistent w OHRP (Office of Human Research Protections) guidance p 68


—The new Human Research Protections Plan does not address “whether or how the recruitment or consent process would introduce safeguards to protect against the inherent coercion of being held for involuntary treatment” and only a single instance where consideration of the dual and potentially conflicting role of treating psychiatrist/investigator was addressed. p 72


—“the current human subjects protection program as it involves psychiatric research does not reflect the best efforts of a University of this caliber.” p 83


Dr. Teri Caraway, a political science professor, assessed the AAHRPP consultants: “The written report was much harder hitting than the verbal responses given by panelists during the question and answer period. It seemed to me that the panelists bent over backwards to put the most positive spin possible on rather shocking findings, and they refused to draw conclusions about whether they found evidence of violations of state or federal regulations, such as Dan’s law, even though the report raised concerns that researchers at the U are still recruiting their own patients.”


It is unfortunate that, in presenting their report to the UMN Faculty senate, the AAHRPP consultants refused to make any statements critical to the UMN, undermining faculty demands for real reform.


In Part 2 on the UMN review, tomorrow, I address what the AAHRPP reviewers missed–or ignored–in their reporting.

Thursday, March 5, 2015

For the Record: Leigh Turner to Office for Human Research Protection - Investigate the University of Minnesota



From Health in the Global Village:

March 4, 2015
Kristina Borror, Ph.D.
Director of the Division of Compliance Oversight
Office for Human Research Protections
Department of Health & Human Services
1101 Wootton Parkway, Suite 200
Rockville, MD, 20852
An Open Letter Requesting an OHRP Investigation of Institutional Protections for Human Research Participants and Psychiatric Clinical Research at the University of Minnesota
Dear Dr. Borror:
An external report commissioned by the University of Minnesota has revealed numerous institutional practices that appear to violate the Common Rule and OHRP Guidance. I request that OHRP investigate apparent violations involving inadequate scientific review of clinical protocols, insufficient attention to risks, and poor documentation of IRB deliberations. The report identifies additional institutional practices and policies that can only be described as alarming because they endanger research subjects. Written by six reviewers selected by the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs (AAHRPP), the report is entitled, “An External Review of the Protection of Human Research Participants at the University of Minnesota with Special Attention to Research with Adults Who May Lack Decision-Making Capacity.”
Despite the gravity of the report’s findings, Eric Kaler, the President of the University of Minnesota, responded to the release of the report by stating that he is “gratified—but not surprised—that the panel found no legal or compliance violations.” What President Kaler failed to acknowledge is that the authors of the report are not federal investigators. While they are familiar with federal regulations governing human subjects research and refer to federal regulations when evaluating institutional policies and research practices, they have no legal authority to make determinations about possible violations of federal regulations. In contrast, OHRP is empowered to investigate allegations of research misconduct and determine whether compliance violations have occurred.
Disturbing findings documented in the report and warranting investigation by OHRP include:
1. Medical IRB lacks members with sufficient expertise to review specific research activities;
2. Violations of IRB policies and insufficient evidence of substantive scientific review;
3. Conflicts of interest and the risk of bias in scientific review;
4. Scientific review, IRB assessment of risks and benefits of research, and inadequate documentation of IRB deliberations;
5. Inadequate IRB documentation and discussion of risks and benefits to research subjects;
6. Inadequate IRB documentation of the discussion of controverted issues and their resolution;
7. Inadequate IRB review of already approved protocols;
8. Inadequate post-approval monitoring of clinical research;
9. IRB Investigative Committees lack sufficient expertise;
10. Investigative Committees fail to adequately interact with complainants and act in a transparent manner;
11. Complaints concerning clinician-investigators in the Department of Psychiatry;
12. Inadequate tools for assessing decision-making capacity of prospective participants in psychiatric clinical trials;
13. Conflicts of interest and the assessment of decision-making capacity;
14. Use of unqualified study personnel to assess capacity to consent and conduct “preliminary consent” discussions;
15. Vulnerability to coercion or undue influence and involuntary commitment orders;
16. Legally Authorized Representatives and apparent noncompliance with the Common Rule and Minnesota Law;
17. Inadequate consideration of challenges in obtaining consent and assessing capacity in studies involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity;
18. Inadequate IRB policy guidance concerning fluctuations in capacity to provide consent;
19. Aggressive recruitment of research subjects;
20. Psychiatric research at Fairview, “A Culture of Fear,” and alleged retaliation against whistleblowers;
21. Inadequate institutional oversight of psychiatric clinical research.
Following this letter I have summarized the 21 specific issues that I believe require investigation by OHRP. I am also providing you with a copy of the full report. If the AAHRPP report is accurate, the University of Minnesota is failing to comply with federal regulations governing the conduct of human subjects research.
Please feel welcome to contact me if you have any questions concerning this request. I am contacting you as an individual faculty member and not on behalf of the institution of the University of Minnesota.
Yours sincerely,
Leigh Turner, PhD
Associate Professor
cc: Jerry Menikoff, Director, Office for Human Research Protections, DHHS
Sean Kassim, Director, Office of Scientific Investigations, FDA
Arne H. Carlson, Former Governor of Minnesota
Terri Bonoff, Minnesota Senator, Chair of the Higher Education & Workforce Development Committee
Carl Elliott, Professor, University of Minnesota Center for Bioethics
Trudo Lemmens, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
Michael Carome, Director, Public Citizen Health Research Group
James Nobles, Legislative Auditor for the State of Minnesota
Eric Kaler, President, University of Minnesota
Richard Beeson, Chair of the Board of Regents, University of Minnesota
Brian Herman, Vice President, University of Minnesota
Brooks Jackson, Vice President, Health Sciences & Medical School Dean,
University of Minnesota
Bruce Blazar, Associate Vice President for Clinical & Translational Science,
University of Minnesota
William Donohue, General Counsel, University of Minnesota
Keith Dunder, Legal Counsel, University of Minnesota Academic Health Center
Elyse Summers, President, Association for the Accreditation of Human
Research Protection Programs


MEDICAL IRB LACKS MEMBERS WITH SUFFICIENT EXPERTISE TO REVIEW SPECIFIC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
According to the report, the Medical institutional review board (IRB) approves many research protocols despite lacking members with sufficient expertise to review particular research activities.
45 CFR 46.107 states, “Each IRB shall have at least five members, with varying backgrounds to promote complete and adequate review of research activities commonly conducted by the institution.” Also, “the IRB shall be sufficiently qualified through the experience and expertise of its members,” and possess “the professional competence necessary to review specific research activities.” 45 CFR 46.107 also states, “If an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a vulnerable category of subjects, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, or handicapped or mentally disabled persons, consideration should be given to the inclusion of one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these subjects.”
According to the report (p. 24-25), from October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014, the IRB reviewed 145 adult hematology, oncology and transplant protocols; 60 cardiology protocols; 46 surgery protocols; 34 pediatric endocrine protocols; and 31 neurology protocols. Despite the high volume of studies in these fields, the report states (p. 25), “Of note, there were no individuals on the IRB during this time period with expertise in adult hematology, oncology and transplant, cardiology, surgery, or neurology, although those fields taken together represented over 300 protocols.” It is worth noting that the report examines just one year of protocols and does not address the subject of IRB membership and adequacy of review across all departments in the medical school.
During the one-year period examined in the report, one psychiatrist served on the committee and the IRB reviewed 85 protocols submitted by members of the Department of Psychiatry. However, this psychiatrist rarely attended IRB meetings. The report notes (p.25), “Based on IRB minutes from January through July 2014, the psychiatrist on the IRB roster attended only four of 26 Medical IRB meetings at which new protocols were reviewed. Thus, at 22 of the 26 meetings at which new IRB protocols were reviewed, there was no member present with an expertise in psychiatry.” The report adds (p. 25-26), “Despite the many situations in which psychiatry protocols were reviewed without a psychiatrist present, no other expert was called upon to provide supplemental review.”
At the four IRB meetings the psychiatrist attended, he had to recuse himself from reviewing four protocols due to a potential conflict of interest. The report notes (p. 25), “The recusal in these situations left the IRB without expertise in psychiatry and in three of the four recusals an IRB staff member was required to join the meeting in order to maintain a quorum.”
Summarizing the panel’s assessment of inadequate expertise on the IRB, the Report states (p. 26),
the Medical IRB does not routinely have the requisite number of members or expertise at its meetings to properly handle the number of studies it reviews…. It was clear to the external review team that the membership of the Medical IRBs did not include sufficient members with the scientific expertise necessary      to adequately address the research being reviewed at corresponding meetings. This departure not only contravenes the University’s own policy of having at least one member with ‘primary professional expertise in a scientific field relevant to the type of research reviewed by that panel,’ but also prompts concerns about the quality of review.
Noting the gravity of the problem, the report adds (p. 27), “The failure to have either adequate number of IRB members, or adequate expertise, during IRB deliberations raises profound questions about the IRB’s ability to conduct a robust and reliable protocol review.”
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the University of Minnesota Medical IRB includes members with sufficient expertise to competently evaluate all of the protocols it reviews.  

VIOLATIONS OF IRB POLICIES AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE SCIENTIFIC REVIEW
The responsible review of clinical research requires careful assessment of scientific methods. Rigorous scientific review is an important component of responsible institutional oversight of human subjects research.
Before preparing its report, the review team examined thirty copies of scientific review documents prepared using the University of Minnesota’s departmental review process. Documentation of scientific review is required when protocols are submitted for IRB review.   According to the report, in some instances, scientific review failed to comply with the University’s own policies. The report states (p. 43), “Of the scientific review documents examined, there was only a single documented scientific reviewer for five studies, in clear violation of the University’s policy requiring a minimum of two reviewers for all departmental level review.”
The review team also found that scientific review of research is often superficial and consists of little more than checking a box or providing a signature on standardized forms. The report states (p.43-44),
Twenty-three of the scientific review documents examined included only non-specific statements and thus provided insufficient evidence that a substantive scientific review had been conducted…. Seven reviews were limited to a checked box or signature on the standardized form referenced above with no commentary that outlined the review process or outcome. In fact, only one of the scientific review documents we examined contained substantive commentary.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether research protocols submitted to the Medical IRB are being subjected to substantive scientific review.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE RISK OF BIAS IN SCIENTIFIC REVIEW
The report documents conflicts of interest in which faculty members reviewed scientific protocols prepared by their department chairs. In such circumstances, faculty members are in a hierarchical reporting relationship to the individuals whose study protocol they are evaluating. There is risk that faculty members in such reporting relationships to department chairs might feel pressure to let their chairs’ studies proceed without requiring substantive revisions. The report states (p.46),
Of the 30 protocols examined for scientific review, five cases were identified where the scientific review was completed by a subordinate faculty member for research in which a department chair was the principal investigator. In these cases, a conflict of interest exists and the risk of bias in the review is significant.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether conflicts-of-interest are undermining the quality of scientific review. I recommend that OHRP examine conflicts of interest in which protocols are reviewed by individuals in reporting relationships to the individuals who have prepared protocols for review.
  
SCIENTIFIC REVIEW, IRB ASSESSMENT OF RISKS AND BENEFITS OF RESEARCH, AND INADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION OF IRB DELIBERATIONS
Careful scientific review is connected to informed assessment of risks and benefits of research. However, according to the report, after scientific reviews are submitted to the IRB, there is little evidence that the IRB incorporates these reviews into its deliberations and determinations. The report states (p. 48),
a review of medical IRB minutes that corresponded to 21 of the protocols for which scientific assessment documents were provided, showed little evidence that the merits of scientific design had been discussed in relation to study risks and benefits. In fact, there was no evidence in those minutes examined to indicate that the scientific review had been either evaluated or discussed…. While it is possible that sufficient documentation about the scientific review was made available to the IRB and that the scientific reviews were adequate and sufficiently discussed, there is insufficient documentation to support this. The lack of documentation raises concerns as to whether IRB systematically reviews the scientific assessment documents accompanying the IRB submission and carefully determines whether they contain sufficient information upon which the IRB can rely.
Federal regulations require IRBs to engage in an informed and scientifically grounded process of examining risks and benefits of research. The report states (p.78), “The federal research regulations permit an IRB, in the course of its protocol review process, to exercise broad discretion in determining when research risks are reasonable in relation to benefits and when research risks are minimized.” Commenting upon this federal regulatory standard the report states (p. 78), “The review team found little evidence that the University’s IRB engaged in a meaningful process of evaluating research risk.”
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the Medical IRB sufficiently incorporates scientific review into its deliberative process, including meaningful discussions that address risks and benefits of research, and provides adequate documentation of such deliberations.

 INADEQUATE IRB DOCUMENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RISKS AND BENEFITS TO RESEARCH SUBJECTS
Examining risks and benefits to research subjects, ensuring that risks to research subjects are minimized, and confirming that risks to research subjects are reasonable when considered in relation to anticipated benefits are important components of IRB deliberations. Such assessments by IRBs are codified in the Common Rule. 45 CFR 46.111 states, IRBs must determine that “risks to subjects are minimized.” IRBs must also establish that “Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.”
According to the report (p28),
In the majority of the minutes from meetings at which new biomedical research proposals were reviewed, the team found little discussion of the risks and benefits to subjects. Requests for ‘Changes in Protocol,’ for example, which primarily involved modifications of the inclusion/exclusion criteria—changes that may increase or decrease risks to subjects—were almost always approved without any documentation of related discussion.
The report adds (p.30), “The review process, as documented in the minutes, does not reflect a meaningful discussion of the risks and benefits of research protocols and the necessary steps taken to protect human subjects in the face of scientific or ethical concerns.”
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the Medical IRB is adequately discussing, weighing, and documenting deliberations concerning risks and benefits to research subjects.

INADEQUATE IRB DOCUMENTATION OF THE DISCUSSION OF CONTROVERTED ISSUES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
45 CFR 46.115 states, “An institution, or when appropriate an IRB, shall prepare and maintain adequate documentation of IRB activities.” IRB minutes must contain “a written summary of the discussion of controverted issues and their resolution.”
According to the report, the medical IRB does not adequately document discussion of what federal regulations describe as “controverted issues and their resolution.” These are topics where it is reasonable to expect discussion, possible disagreement, and reasoned argumentation proceeding toward a resolution. The report states (p. 28-29),
A controverted issue usually means that there are questions, or at times disagreements, requiring a more extended discussion about a given protocol. Examples of controverted issues include concerns about placebos, payments to subjects, recruitment methods, risks, etc. In each set of minutes received by the team there is a section titled, ‘Discussion of Controverted Issues Summary.’ Most of the minutes reviewed, however, stated that ‘there were no controverted issues,’ even on those occasions when the required changes would seem to have warranted a more substantive discussion and where the IRB correspondence to the study teams indicated that ‘controverted issues’had in fact been discussed. Accordingly, the minutes did not completely or accurately appear to represent what occurred during the IRB meetings.
The report adds (p.30), “the inadequate documentation of review and the sheer volume of research being reviewed…suggests that the IRB review process may be unacceptable, and that it often contravenes the IRB’s own policies and procedures.”
Given that review of the medical IRB’s activities is limited to examination of meeting minutes, it is unclear whether the problem is confined to inadequate documentation of discussions that are in fact occurring or extends to insufficient discussion of issues meriting discussion and resolution by the IRB.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the Medical IRB is addressing and documenting discussion of controverted issues in a manner that complies with the Common Rule.

INADEQUATE IRB REVIEW OF ALREADY APPROVED PROTOCOLS
Addressing the subject of continuing IRB review, the report states (p. 29), “the length of time allotted for IRB review was alarmingly inadequate given the number of complex items scheduled for review on many of the IRB agendas reviewed.” For example, at a three-hour meeting on July 30, 2014, the IRB performed continuing review of 57 already approved protocols. Three minutes was the average time allotted for the review of each protocol. Likewise, on September 24, 2014, during a 2.5-hour meeting, the IRB performed continuing review of 46 protocols, with an average of three minutes for the review of each protocol.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether an average of three minutes per protocol is sufficient time for continuing review.

INADEQUATE POST-APPROVAL MONITORING OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
The University of Minnesota, as with peer research institutions, has a monitoring system for post-approval review of human subjects research. At the University of Minnesota this program is known as the Post-Approval Review (PAR) program. Monitoring is supposed to assess the conduct of research after study protocols have been approved by the IRB. According to the report, (p.53)
Although the external review team found evidence of a robust PAR monitoring program, the feedback received during on-site reviews was at odds with these initial conclusions. In fact, during the site visit, we repeatedly heard monitoring cited as a primary area of deficiency and one that had the potential to pose the greatest institutional risk, as the reviews were thought to be infrequent and of poor quality. Although efforts were reportedly underway to increase staffing and resources for monitoring efforts, some high-level staff members expressed their concern that monitoring efforts had not yet achieved the desired standard. Notably, there were specific reports about the lack of monitoring of the research conducted at Fairview (as well as the lack of communication about the need for monitoring) despite the fact that the monitoring function for human subjects research conducted at Fairview is the responsibility of the University under the Master Agreement between the two institutions.
I urge OHRP to investigate the adequacy of post-approval review of human subjects research approved by the University of Minnesota’s Medical IRB. I recommend that OHRP to pay particular attention to post-approval monitoring of psychiatric clinical trials conducted at the University of Minnesota Medical Center at Fairview. 

IRB INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEES LACK SUFFICIENT EXPERTISE
When possible regulatory noncompliance is identified, the IRB’s Executive Committee is responsible for delegating investigations to three person investigative committees (IC). According to the Report (p.33), “any IC may lack sufficiently relevant expertise to conduct an adequate investigation.” For example, referring to ongoing investigations of psychiatric research at the University, the Report states (p. 33), “The external review team was particularly concerned that, given the nature of the complaints, neither of the active investigations to which it was privy during this evaluation had members with relevant expertise in psychiatry.”
I urge OHRP to investigate whether IRB Investigative Committees tasked with investigating possible regulatory noncompliance possess sufficient expertise.

INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEES FAIL TO ADEQUATELY INTERACT WITH COMPLAINANTS AND ACT IN A TRANSPARENT MANNER
When research subjects or their loved ones file complaints with the Medical IRB, the IRB is supposed to take reasonable steps to attend to their concerns, investigate, and provide timely responses to complainants. However, there is reason to question whether the Medical IRB adequately responds to complaints, investigates them in a thorough manner, and provides complainants with a report describing the results of their investigation. The report notes the failure of Investigative Committees to engage in meaningful interaction with complainants and report findings upon completion of investigations. Referring to one investigation in progress at the time the research team was conducting its inquiry, the report states, (p.33), “The team was made aware that the IC for Investigation 1 did not meet with the complainant, other than via telephone, and instead focused its review primarily on relevant clinical and study-related records.”
The report also indicates (p. 33) that inadequate transparency is an issue. “During its evaluation, the external review team learned of a general concern regarding the lack of transparency of IC findings, particularly as they relate to following-up with complainants to inform them of the progress and outcomes of the investigations.”
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the Medical IRB and its Investigative Committees adequately respond to complaints, investigate them, and communicate their findings to complainants.

COMPLAINTS CONCERNING CLINICIAN-INVESTIGATORS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY
After the research team submitted its report to University of Minnesota, senior administrators redacted the names of the individuals who have been at the center of allegations of psychiatric research misconduct. According to the report (p.82),
In the course of our interviews, many concerns were voiced about the commitment to human subjects protection of [NAME REDACTED] and [NAME REDACTED]. While anecdotal, the clear pattern that emerged was of two investigators whom faculty and staff do not trust and who fail to communicate a set of priorities that align their own research agenda with the best interests of patients and patient care. Similarly, administrative staff involved in IRB review voiced criticisms of the care taken by [NAME REDACTED] in protocol submissions and in interactions with the IRB. Documentation of IRB review provides some additional support for these statements and an example of resistance by [NAME REDACTED] to IRB efforts to introduce the use of an independent consent monitor.
The report adds (p. 83),
In other ways, it appears that [NAME REDACTED] does not take a sufficiently active role in efforts to promote higher ethical standards with the Department. For example, by emphasizing human subjects protections in the department’s strategic plan, [NAME REDACTED] could have communicated the priority of this work and make a compelling statement to the Department and beyond. For a department as embattled as the Department of Psychiatry with regard to the ethics of research, the omission of ethics from the strategic plan indicates an insensitivity to matters of paramount concern within the Department, the    University, and the community.
The report notes (p.84) the importance of addressing widespread skepticism toward the activity of one unidentified faculty member. “There is a need on the part of the University, Fairview, and the Department to acknowledge, understand, and remedy the evident distrust of the work of [NAME REDACTED].”
Vice President for Research Brian Herman has an unredacted copy of the report. I urge you to investigate whether the psychiatrists identified in the report violated the Common Rule.

INADEQUATE TOOLS FOR ASSESSING DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY OF PROSPECTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN PSYCHIATRIC CLINICAL TRIALS
Assessing decision-making capacity is a delicate undertaking requiring professional expertise, suitable assessment tools, good clinical judgment, and integrity. At the University of Minnesota, researchers in the Department of Psychiatry use a six-item “evaluation to sign consent” form when “assessing” decision-making capacity of prospective research subjects. According to the report (p. 79), a member of the clinical research team completes and signs the form, certifying that “the above subject is alert, able to communicate, and able to give acceptable answers to the items above.” The report notes (p. 79), “While this approach has the advantage of requiring some discussion between the investigator and the potential subject, in the review team’s judgment, it is insufficient.”
Although this point is not mentioned in the report, there are allegations that duplicate (photocopied) evaluation to sign consent forms have been deposited in patients’ medical records. More specifically, there are concerns that a single pre-completed and photocopied evaluation to sign consent form has been used in the context of psychiatric clinical trials. While the veracity of such allegations could easily be resolved by publicly disclosing documents already sought through Data Practices Act filings, to date university administrators have refused to release such documents.
I urge OHRP to investigate how “evaluation to sign consent” forms are used to assess decision-making capacity of prospective research participants. This document does not appear to be a sufficient tool to evaluate whether individuals are competent to make informed decisions about whether they wish to enroll in psychiatric research studies. I also urge OHRP to investigate whether members of clinical research teams are placing in patients’ medical records pre-completed “evaluation to sign consent forms.”

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY
When assessing individuals’ decision-making capacity, it is imperative that conflicts-of-interest not influence the integrity of the assessment process.
At the University of Minnesota, treating psychiatrists who are also clinician-investigators sometimes assess the decision-making capacity of prospective study participants. In some instances, components of the assessment process are delegated to members of the clinical research team. Such arrangements can create conflicts-of-interest that compromise the integrity of the assessment process.
The report states (p.79),
It is the external review team’s opinion, that, in the context of the many concerns raised about recruitment and enrollment in Departmental Research, the University, IRB and investigator should have introduced an independent assessment of capacity for relevant research. For example, some institutions require (for defined categories of research) that an assessment of capacity be made by a trained individual who is not a member of the research team and who does not report to the principal investigator. In this manner, neither the investigator nor his/her paid staff are responsible for determining whether the prospective subject meets a reasonable standard for capacity to consent; such separation of responsibilities between the investigator and prospective subject helps ensure that real and perceived conflicts of interest are mitigated or even     eliminated.
The failure to adequately separate such roles and responsibilities appears to be a longstanding problem associated with the recruitment of prospective study subjects for psychiatric clinical trials.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether members of clinical research teams are assessing decision-making capacity of prospective research participants rather than obtaining independent assessment of capacity.  

USE OF UNQUALIFIED STUDY PERSONNEL TO ASSESS CAPACITY TO CONSENT AND CONDUCT “PRELIMINARY CONSENT” DISCUSSIONS
Assessing decision-making capacity of prospective research subjects requires specialized clinical skills. The Report notes (p.80), “The decision that a prospective research subject can or cannot make a consent decision for herself or himself is one that requires considerable training or expertise.” Despite the necessity of such expertise, the Report adds (p. 80),
Boilerplate language inserted in many of the IRB protocols reviewed by the team state, ‘All study personnel have completed University of Minnesota HIPAA and CITI training. Study personnel will be trained and certified by the sponsor to administer rating scales. Research coordinators may conduct the preliminary consent discussion, but consent will be obtained by the Principal Investigator or Co-Investigator.’ This is inadequate, though, since neither HIPAA, CITI, nor sponsor training…address the relevant details of consent and capacity to consent. The question as to whether an investigator (and his or her coordinator) is appropriately trained and able to devote the time required to the consent process is one that the IRB should consider in its review and monitoring efforts.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether inadequately trained members of clinical research teams sometimes play a role in assessing the decision-making capacity of prospective research participants and conducting “preliminary consent” discussions.
  
VULNERABILITY TO COERCION OR UNDUE INFLUENCE AND INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT ORDERS
Some prospective and actual research subjects are highly vulnerable to coercion or undue influence. Addressing this important issue, the Report states (p. 66),
Federal regulations require that an investigator ‘shall seek such consent only under circumstances that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.’ Further, ‘When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such as…mentally disabled persons, additional     safeguards have been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.’ Neither University policies nor practice distinguish between vulnerability to coercion or undue influence when it could occur with subjects who are limited in their understanding of the research. This area of concern is     heightened in psychiatric setting situations where there is a prospect of civil commitment (i.e., involuntary hospitalization), since that threat can increase a prospective subject’s vulnerability to coercion or undue influence.
Describing the University of Minnesota’s troubled record in this area, the report adds (p. 66),
Despite a history that includes legislative intervention by the State to protect subjects perceived to be in potentially coercive situations (i.e., those under a stay of an involuntary mental health commitment order), the external review team found no evidence that the University, Fairview, and its investigators have taken steps to ensure a broader understanding of the implications of this very fraught situation. When patients with severe behavioral disorders are in the medically unique circumstance of facing legal compulsion to receive treatment against his or her will, that prospect can affect their decision-making. Simply put, the fear of being subjected to an involuntary legal process for perceived noncooperation, even if there is no direct threat of such legal compulsion, is an overwhelming barrier to voluntariness. Yet none of the studies examined by the external review panel referenced, or distinguished among potential subjects based upon, civil commitment status, apart from verifying compliance with the state law.
According to the report (p.67),
The above problem, i.e., the risk of coercion or the appearance of coercion, is further exacerbated when the principal investigator is also the treating physician and thus has the power to initiate the individual’s involuntary confinement. We found only a single instance where consideration of the dual and potentially conflicting role of treating psychiatrist/investigator was addressed.
Noting “a recent investigation that addressed a complaint related to a subject who was recruited for a study and in fact provided consent to research while under a temporary involuntary hold,” the report notes, “the potential impact of that status (i.e., being held involuntarily) on the subject’s ability to provide consent was not referenced.”
Summarizing the importance of ensuring that consent is not sought from research subjects vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, the report states (p. 68),
The University should directly and thoughtfully address the specific issues related to the context in which acutely ill psychiatric patients are identified, recruited, and asked to consent to research. Policies are needed that reflect the imperative to refrain from seeking consent when there is situational impairment as a result of an acute physical or psychological event.
I urge OHRP to investigate allegations that individuals with mental illnesses and who are vulnerable to coercion or undue influences have been recruited into psychiatric clinical trials in a manner that is not compliant with federal regulations. I also urge OHRP to investigate whether the university’s research protection program has provided adequate institutional oversight of psychiatric clinical trials including this vulnerable study population.

 LEGALLY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES AND APPARENT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMON RULE AND MINNESOTA LAW
According to the report (p.71), “The University’s interpretation of the regulatory term ‘applicable law,’ and therefore its policies defining who may serve as a legally authorized representative in federally funded research, do not appear to adequately conform to federal regulations and related guidance.”
Describing the research team’s review of study protocols, the report notes (p.72),
The review team also observed inconsistencies with regard to the planned inclusion of subjects who lack the capacity to consent. Often, within the same protocol, it would state that only subjects with the capacity to consent would be included, and then might later state that LARs would be used when potential subjects lacked capacity. Many of these conflicting messages were contained in applications from the Department of Psychiatry, despite the fact that members of that Department told the external review panel that they do not use LARs for any studies.
In a footnote, the report notes (p. 72), “This statement by the Department was directly contradicted by a protocol submitted in September that was explicit about the intended use of LARs when subjects lacked decision-making capacity.” Drawing attention to the apparent lack of discussion of these issues by the IRB, the report states (p.72), “The IRB minutes reviewed by the team did not address these discrepancies.”
Addressing whether university policies concerning LARs are compliant with Minnesota state law, the report states (p.71),
University policy and IRB protocols reflect inconsistencies and, in some cases, appear to be at odds with Minnesota Law…. Also, the prohibition against research consent by a legal guardian without a specific court order does not appear to be applied consistently, as guardians are sometimes referenced in research protocols as fulfilling the LAR’s function without mention of any authorization by the court.
Despite these inconsistences and reports of protocols failing to comply with state law (p. 71), “none of the IRB minutes reviewed by the team reflect discussion about who may serve as a LAR.”
According to the report, problems related to LARs extended to both clinical protocols and IRB deliberations. It notes (p. 73),
The policies and practices adopted by the IRB do not yet provide adequate guidance for investigators on the best means of identifying and educating those individuals who are permitted to function as a LAR in a given situation. Protocols and other information reviewed by the team indicate wide disparities and failures in understanding the definition and appropriate selection of LARs. Only a few sets of the IRB minutes that were assessed by the external review team commented on these discrepancies, and none addressed the question of legal authority. This evidenced a lack of appreciation for the gravity of replacing an individual’s autonomous consent with that of a surrogate in the research context. It should be well understood by all those involved in research with prospective subjects with limited decision-making capacity that the use of a surrogate for research consent calls for heightened levels of scrutiny.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the University’s policies, practices, and protocols addressing and involving legally authorized representatives (LARs) are compliant with federal regulations.

INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF CHALLENGES IN OBTAINING CONSENT AND ASSESSING CAPACITY IN STUDIES INVOLVING ADULTS WITH IMPAIRED DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY
Researchers and institutional review boards must be particularly sensitive to issues of capacity assessment and informed consent when conducting clinical trials involving research participants with impaired decision-making ability. According to the report, psychiatrists and the IRB have not addressed these topics with the sensitivity required to conduct clinical trials involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity. From a sample of 89 studies that (p.61) “posed more than minimal risk and that included subjects from diagnostic groups that may include adults with impaired decision-making capacity,” the review team selected for review “a cross section of 20 protocols.” The majority of protocols reviewed by the team predated a 2014 revision to the Institutional Review Board’s consent policy. According to the Report (p. 62),
These earlier protocols contained little or no information about the consent process and virtually no details as to how capacity would be assessed, regardless of whether a targeted population was likely to include prospective subjects with impaired decision-making capacity and regardless of the level of risk. The corresponding IRB meeting minutes similarly failed to reflect a review of these issues by the IRB.
The report describes several protocols that do not appear to comply with contemporary standards for the responsible conduct of human subjects research. The report notes (p. 62),
a number of practices described in the examined documents reflected a departure from recognized standards designed to support autonomous decision-making (with appropriate protections) for those who cannot make decisions for themselves regarding participation in research. For example, the team noted the arguably inappropriate use of a LAR when the subject’s disability was physical rather than related to consent capacity. In one such protocol, the IRB required the addition of a signature line for surrogate consent because ‘some subjects may not be able to sign their name when enrolling in this trial.’ In still other cases, the internal policy was to ‘err on the side’ of obtaining consent by a LAR, even when the individual may be able to make a consent decision on his or her own.
The report notes (p. 63) the recent development of a new IRB policy entitled, “Adults Lacking Capacity to Consent.” This policy states (p. 63), “prospective adult subjects with impairments to functional abilities are presumed to be capable of providing consent unless there is substantial evidence otherwise.” This standard is problematic because the presumption that subjects are capable of providing informed consent to participate in research could have the unintended effect of seeking consent from individuals lacking decision-making capacity. According to the report (p. 63),
this major change eliminated the requirement that a researcher must proactively ensure that prospective subjects possess the capacity to consent to participate in research. While the University’s IRB reported having had discussions about the important balance between protection and autonomy when discussing and enacting these revisions, the external review team questions whether the new approach aligns with current guidance and best practice.
Questioning the IRB’s new policy, the report (p. 63) refers to OHRP Guidance that states, “the informed consent process should ensure…that prospective subjects or their legally authorized representatives adequately understand the research so that they can make informed choices.” With this approach, the Report notes (p. 63), “The process of obtaining consent for research thereby requires the researcher to affirmatively establish that a prospective subject understands the risks and benefits of the proposed study, as well as the available alternatives to participation.” According to the Report (p. 63), “University policy, which assumes capacity to consent to research absent ‘substantial evidence’ to the contrary, is inconsistent with the principles underlying the OHRP guidance.”
The report also notes (p.65),
studies examined by the team seldom showed the IRB to be engaged in a substantive discussion of the potential tools that might be utilized in an assessment of consent capacity. These could include, among other practices: 1) the use of a decision tree that outlines the different potential requirements for assessment of consent capacity, starting from a universal informal subject assessment for consent capacity for all subjects and moving to more formal and validated independent assessments when impairment is more likely to be present, capacity fluctuations are likely, anticipated benefits are fewer, and foreseeable risks are greater; or 2) the use of independent consent monitors to oversee and assist with the assessment of capacity. In the protocols reviewed following the implementation of the new policy changes, the external review team found no evidence that these types of tools had been considered or implemented.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether psychiatric clinical studies including research subjects with impaired decision-making capacity complied with federal regulations governing human subjects research. I also urge OHRP to investigate whether past and present IRB Policies concerning adults lacking capacity to consent and IRB deliberations addressing this subject comply with federal regulations.

INADEQUATE IRB POLICY GUIDANCE CONCERNING FLUCTUATIONS IN CAPACITY TO PROVIDE CONSENT
Assessing circumstances in which there is potential for fluctuations in decision-making capacity, the report states (p. 69), “The team found a lack of robust guidance and consistent application of policy in situations in which fluctuations in capacity can be reasonably anticipated as a component of a subject’s condition.”
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the university has adequate IRB policy guidance concerning research subjects and prospective research subjects with fluctuations in capacity to provide consent.

AGGRESSIVE RECRUITMENT OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
Fairview staff members interviewed by the research team described (p. 81-82)
a ‘pervasive lack of trust’ specific to ‘behavioral’ research at Fairview. Others reported a perception of the Department’s ‘overly aggressive’ approach to subject recruitment, which is seen as being at odds with patient-centered clinical priorities. A review of records of complaints and concerns submitted via the Fairview Research Helpline by Fairview staff has provided additional support for these perceptions.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the alleged “aggressive recruitment” of research subjects violated the Common Rule.

PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH AT FAIRVIEW, “A CULTURE OF FEAR,” AND ALLEGED RETALIATION AGAINST WHISTLEBLOWERS
Whether engaged in clinical research activities or providing care outside the context of clinical research, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, social workers and other health care providers as well as research subjects and their loved ones should not have to function in an institutional “culture of fear.” Nonetheless, the report states (p.88), “Faculty and staff in Psychiatry repeatedly characterized the climate of work as a ‘culture of fear.’ They provided stories of intimidation by researchers and fear of retaliation should staff voice opposition to practices that were of concern.”
According to the report (p.88),
concerns were also raised with regard to University policies on whistleblowing that include the language ‘no one will retaliate against individuals who acted in good faith in reporting.’ The external review team was told a story by a longstanding University employee about another who was terminated after having expressed concern about a research study involving the elderly, and further, that the concerns were ignored.  Again, the external review team cannot conclude that this indicates a problem with the institution’s response to ‘whistleblowers,’ rather, that there is such a perception. True or not, the potential impact of such concerns is considerable.
I urge OHRP to investigate whether the alleged “culture of fear” in the Department of Psychiatry has made individuals fearful of reporting allegations of noncompliance. I also urge OHRP to investigate whether any whistleblowers or prospective whistleblowers have suffered retaliation or threat of retaliation as a result of reporting allegations of wrongdoing or revealing their intention to file such reports. In addition, I recommend that OHRP investigate whether the university’s research protection program has taken adequate steps to protect whistleblowers and ensure that individuals reporting or indicating their intention to report complaints about clinical research have not suffered retaliation or been threatened with retaliation.

INADEQUATE INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF PSYCHIATRIC CLINICAL RESEARCH
Fairview administrators and clinical staff members reportedly play no role in approving clinical studies at Fairview or monitoring ongoing trials. In addition to expressing concerns about inadequate institutional oversight, they appear to have observed an alarming discrepancy between approved psychiatric clinical studies and prospective research subjects available for recruitment. According to the report (p.81),
the Fairview leadership and staff reportedly have no input in the approval process for human subjects research, and no program for monitoring or quality assurance of ongoing research. According to the Fairview leadership, one specific consequence of this inability to participate in the vetting of protocols by their staff is that studies are often approved for which the subject population required is simply not among the patient populations available for recruitment, or are not available in the numbers required.
I urge OHRP to investigate the University of Minnesota Medical Center, Fairview’s institutional oversight of psychiatric clinical research conducted at that institution, the adequacy of institutional oversight the University of Minnesota Medical IRB provides for psychiatric research at Fairview, and whether the relationship between these institutions sufficiently promotes protections for psychiatric research subjects.